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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP

A myL. Wax
Professor Elhauge's main thesis is that technology assessment is un1
likely to slow the cost explosion in health care. Ideally, technology assessment would identify unnecessary, ineffective, or exce ssively expensive methods for treating or evaluating illness, or for delivering health
care. But, according to Professor Elhauge, technology assessment does
not prove useful in altering the patterns of consumption of medical care
or in reducing inefficiencies. Significant savings cannot be achieved over
the long run by wringing "waste" from the system, and neither elimination of medically useless therapies nor the development of more efficient
methods of treatment or delivery of care will reduce the inexorable cost
escalation that has been a feature of our medical care system for decades.
Rather, significant control of health care costs will require moving beyond a quest for mere efficiency-the achievement of the most benefit
for the least cost-to medical rationing, which entails trading off real
2
health care benefits.
According to Professor Elhauge, the route to cost savings through

·Professor of Law, Unive rsity of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful for the able
research assistance of Eliza Platts-Mills .
' Einer Elhauge, The Limited Po tential of T ech nology Assessment, 82 Va_ L. Rev. 1525
(1996). Professor Elhauge distinguishes purely ·'informational" technology assessment
fr o m "regulatory" technology assessment.
He describes '·regulatory " technology
assessment as the process of using information to allocate health care resour ces.
"Informational" technology assessment is the process of gathering systematic data about
the benefits and costs of medical therapies , techniques, a nd treatment strategies. See id.
at 1527-29. Medical technology assessment, or a component of what Professor Elhauge
refers to as "informational" technology assessment, typically takes the form of "outcomes
research," which involves "examining large amounts of data abo ut rates of various
outcomes given various treatments " in well-defined populations o f patients. Fred Gifford,
Outcomes Research and Practice Guidelines: Upstream Issues for Downstream Users,
Hastings Ctr. Rpt. , Mar.-Apr. 1996 , at 38 , 38. It requires "statistical analyses of outcome
data drawn from very large data bases." !d. These includ e data se ts generated specificall,y
for the purpose of evaluating the th e rapies at issue, as well as pre-existing data
compilations in the form of company records, insurance files , or hospital charts. Id. a t 3839; see a lso Sandra J. Tanenbaum , Knowing and Acting in Medical Prac tice: The
Epistemological Politics of Outcomes Research, 19 J. H ea lth Po l. Pol'y & L. 27 (1994).
2 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1546-47. I use the te rm "med ical rationing" in reference to
Professor Elhauge 's notion that if there is to be a reducti o n in the ever-increasing po rtion
of national wealth devoted to med ical care, som e patients within the system must sacrifice
some degree of the well-be ing that could be achieved by providing all potentially available
care.
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medical rationing is effectively blocked by the absolutist paradigm, which
mandates that no patient be denied any treatment known to be medically
beneficial, however marginal the benefit or however great the cost. This
absolutist imperative has a firm grip on the medical establishment, Professor Elhauge contend s, and is re lentlessly enforced by a variety of powerful forces and institutional a?ents, operating on multiple levels within
the existing health care system. Against this dominant paradigm, Professor Elhauge argues, technology assessment is virtually useless . The
problem of exploding health care costs sterns not from lack of information-which is what technology assessment is designed to provide-but
from other factors, such as the inability to agree on the morality and desirability of rationing, the lack of a coh erent and unproblematic protocol
for allocating limited medical resources, and the absence of a workable
institutional framework for enforcing a comprehensive rationing scherne. 4
In challenging Professor Elhauge 's view of the potential for technology assessment to achieve cost control, I begin with our points of agreement. I accept, for purposes of this Comment, that if rationing means
that someone, somewhere, will forgo at least some possibility of medical
benefit,' then some kind of rationing-as opposed to mere " waste" reduction-is probably necessary to arrest the relentless inflation of health
care costs. There is also no denying that the absolutist rnindset-which
6
opposes planned limits on individuals ' access to treatment that is be-

J See Elhauge, supra no te 1, at 1537-38.
" Id . at 1526-31 .
5
Of course, defining rationing as the relinquishm en t of some "known" me dical benefit is
not very informative, because the medical effects of eve n commonly used therapies can be
estimated o nly by o bserving probabilities in populations that can pote ntially be
categorized, subdivided, a nd tested in ma ny different wa ys. The categories of "known"
be nefit , " possible" be nefit , a nd "unknown" benefit are best thought of as points on a
constantly fluctuating continuum that is a function both of the observed e ffects of a
treatment in pa rticular populations and of how much information has bee n gathered in
populations of differe nt size and characte ris tics. The size o f the population studied is
particularly critical to the ability to meas ure e ffects of therapi es: for example, benefits that
d o not show up in a sma ll e r population may be revealed in a !arger o ne. As a rough rule
of thumb-a nd one that inev ita bl y piggybacks o n the so mewhat arbitrary conventions of
epidemiology-! would define the possibility of benefit as coexte nsive with a statistically
significant chance of observing a measurable effect (however small) in some patients
within a popul a ti o n of th e size usu a ll y considere d adeq ua te to eva luat e the e fficacy of a
pa rtic ular thera py. Tak e n to its ex treme, the abso lutist paradigm would require that a
treat ment be made avai labl e e ven if th e re was a very small chance o f conferring a
minimal , but statistica lly detectable, be nefit o n a few perso ns in a large targe t popul a tion
with a particular conditi o n. Such a be ne fit co uld be desc ribe d in man y different ways.
There is a " rea l" o r "k nown" benefit in the se nse that someone in the target population
can be ex pected to experien ce so me pos itive e ffe ct , howeve r minima l. But, the benefit is
" unce rt a in, " or even " unlik e ly, " to the ex tent that o nly a very sma ll number of patients
will respond, th e response is s ma ll , a nd th e patients cannot be identified a hea d of time .
" Professor Elhauge note s that our society seems more to lerant of institutional priorities
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lieved to present some chance of medical benefit, however remote holds considerable sway in the health care community.
Beyond those major areas of agreement, I must part company with
Professor Elhauge. Here I speak primarily as a physician and former
practitioner-as someone who has done time " down on the ground"rather than as a legal scholar or a theorist of health care delivery systems.
I disagree with Professor Elhauge's central conclusion that technology
assessment is useless against the influence of the absolutist paradigm that
pervades the health care establishment. On the contrary, technology assessment has a vital role to play in helping to subvert the hostility towards cost-benefit tradeoffs.
The choice of the word "subvert" is quite deliberate. A s Professor Elhauge has explored elsewhere, the task of formulating, justifying and setting up a comprehensive system of rationing presents overwhelming
8
challenges of justification and coordination. It is virtually impossible to
devise a fully satisfying and theoretically coherent rationing system that is
completely consistent with all our principles and moral commitments.
Therefore, the idea of rationing has come to acquire a bad name among
philosophers, analysts and health care experts, and is unpopular with
health care decision makers who are charged with publicly justifying their
allocational decisions (such as university medical centers, governmental
policymakers and judges).
I submit, however, that these theoretical tensions have simply pushed
rationing underground: It is practiced covertly or informally, defying the
uncompromising claims of absolutism in small and subtle ways. Rationing governs practice far more than express theoretical commitments, and
hence is the purview of those who function on the "front lines" of the system. The day-to-day business of placing limits on care is an ad hoc, decentralized, piecemeal, informal , intermittent, intensely local and often
erratic phenomenon-which makes it hard to discuss, difficult to demonstrate, and almost impossible to survey and quantify. Providing definitive
evidence of the existence and extent of actual rationing, therefore, is not
easy. It is the task of an empiricist, not a theoretician. It is the job of a
medical sociologist or anthropologist, not a philosopher or professor of
that risk future detrimental effects on pe rs o ns who cannot be identified ahead of time;o-ca lled stati stical lives-th a n it is o f all ocative me thods that d e ny ca re to spe cified
indi vidu a ls who are known to be in imm e di a te nee d of medical interve ntion. See Elhauge,
;upra note 1, a t 1570.
' Because th e concept of me dical bene fit is inextricably bo und up with co nsid e rations of
mce rtainty and risk , th e meaning o f th e phras e "som e chance of medical be nefit ," is open
.o debat e-a de bat e that is re flect ed in the literature regarding the definition of medical
·utility. See supra note 5 , and infra note 38 and ac companying text.
' Einer Elhauge, All ocating H e alth Ca re Morall y, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1449 (1994)
here inafte r Elhauge, Allocating H ealth Care Mora lly] .
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law. The premise of this Comment-which must provisionally be taken
on faith-is that rationing goes on every day in the practice of medicine,
in a form that presents real tradeoffs between costs and benefits. Armchair analysis can only take us so far in satisfying those who may be skeptical of this premise .
Thus, the rationing I describe and discuss in this Comment differs from
the rationing with which Professor Elhauge has been primarily concerned
in his role as a legal scholar and student of the health care system. In his
previous work, Professor Elhauge has been preoccu~ied with centralized,
bureaucratic, "top-down" mechanisms of rationing. This is understandable, since he has set out to devise and justify a comprehensive system for
allocating health care resources. In accomplishing this project, he necessarily seeks theoretical consistency, which requires examining transystemically all decisions made for all patients within a complete and closed
system of care.
While any fully rigorous and theoretically satisfying rationing system
must be global , most real-world rationing remains firmly local. In a re10
cent piece, Professor Mark Hall describes the complexity and character
of real-world rationing, and offers a defense of physicians' practice of
limiting, forgoing, or delaying potentially beneficial care of individual patients on a case-by-case basis-a practice he terms "bedside rationing." 11
How does rationing at the bedside work? The key is that it is uncoordinated, sporadic and informal. It is accomplished through the type of
messy, ad hoc decision-making that physicians and patients engage in
every day.
The ideal of quality care has come to be equated with care that is tailored to the individual patient, but in a way that is fully cognizant of
sound scientific principles. Indeed, it is unlikely that medical care that
departs from this model can be, or has ever been, considered good. Decisions concerning the provision, intensity and duration of care are routinely made on a highly individualized basis, in conjunction with, and after consultation with, patients and their families.
The model of
individualized care, although not without potentially serious drawbacks
and temptations (such as its ever-present invitation to an unrigorous anecdotal approach), also opens the door to rationing of a very modest and
discreet kind . That rationing takes the form of "the prudent trimming of

' Id. at 1493-1502, 1508-26.
10
Mark A. Hall, Rationing H e alth Care at the Bedside, 69 N Y.U L Rev. 693 (1994).
11 ld. at 699.
For another defense of physician-implemented limits on care, se e David
Ore ntlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial ince ntives to Limit Car e , 30 U.
Rich . L Rev. 155 (1996).
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incrementally beneficial services, " rather than of stark and wrenching
choices between the use or outright denial of clearly lifesaving treatment.
Bedside rationing is best characterized as a method of responding to the
day-to-day need to make small decisions in an atmosphere of parti al uncert ainty and speculative possibilities, rather than as an intentio nal relinquishment of the precisely defined benefits of well-understood methods.
Bedside rationing is a creature of the conservatism that is one very important element of the cluster of values and norms that inform the practice of medicine. It is a by-product of a cautious, less intensely interventionist practice style that still retains a significant degree of influence
within the profession. It balances tradition, local convention, and trust in
clinical judgment against the all-out reliance on expensive new technologies. In mapping out strategies that present some risk of forgoing medical benefit, as Professor H all puts it , "[c]ost-benefit trade-offs [are]
13
largely subliminal in physicians' thought processes," rather than overtly
considered. Cost considerations are unconsciously internalized as one of
many factors bearing on the choice of particular treatment strategies. A
pronounced disproportion between cost and benefit might subtly sway
the decision-making process. Certainly, cost considerations help shape
many physicians' sense of the appropriate pace and aggressiveness of appro ach to particular medical or diagnostic problems.
In sum, financial considerations probably influence medical decision making "on the ground," but their influence is imperfect, fluctuatin g, and
indirect. Cost pressures and concerns find expression through evolving
traditions and conventions of accepted practice, rather than through the
rigid imposition of explicit rules which would mark the type of centralized rationing regime with which Professor Elhauge is most directly concerned.
That cost considerations do come into play should come as no surprise .
The habits of practicing physicians have evolved in practice settings in
which resources have often been limited. The widespread availability of
14
health insurance is a phenomenon barely fifty years old in this country.
There are approximately forty-two million _uninsured persons in the
1
United States, according to a recent report. ) Physicians must routinely
cope with the limitations imposed by the difficulty of paying for care.
The internalized habits of restraint, which remain useful in dealing with

Ha ll, supra no te 10, a t 712 .
ld. at 713.
'"See He rman M. So mers & Ann e R . Som e rs, Doctors, Pati e nts, and He a lth Ins uran ce
10-11 ( 1961 ) .
'' See E. Richa rd Bro wn , Data Watch : Tre nds in Hea lth Insurance Coverage ln
Califo rnia , 1989-1 993, H e alth Aff., Spring 1996, at 11 8, 120.
I?

u
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uninsured patients, carry forward traditions from an era when few had
16
medical insurance and cost was a factor in most patients' care. Even today, educational practice, local custom, and peer pressure continue to
foster those traditions to some extent, shaping those notions of wise or
prudent medical care. Recent cost-cutting imperatives, fueled by institutional changes that favor fixed-fee over fee-for-service forms of reimbursement, are likely to reinforce, rather than extinguish, the conservative habits that retain influence in some quarters, even in the face of the
relentless escalation in the expectations for care that have been fueled by
17
countervailing forces. To be sure, conventions of practice are in con-

16
To be sur e, the costs of ro utin e medical care were far less o nerous for the average
pe rson before the insu rance era. There a lso were far fewer treatment options. But it is
important to reme mbe r that basic tene ts of m ed ical e thics and practice were establish ed at
a time when the majority of patients paid for medi ca l care out of their own pockets.
17 Traditional fee-for-s e rvice medicine provides few inc e ntives for physicians to limit
care, a nd rewards physicians for providing physician-based services. Since physicians
r eceive rei mburse men t for each service provided, they e nhance personal income only by
providing more services. Se e Ore ntlich er, supra note 11, at 158. Moreover , fee-for service patients ··are not very discriminating purchasers of health care ," nor do they have
much incentive to limit th e ir consumption of medical services. Id. at 188-89. It is widely
accepted that the combinati o n of fee-for-service medicine and coverage base d on
"medical necessity" is a sure formula for cost explosion. The inflationary pressure is
greatest for pa ti e nts covered by hea lth insurance plans that are highly deferential to th e
physician's judgment of what is "medically necessary" care. Such plans dominated the
sce ne during th e first few decades of the post-war period , and influence d the initial design
of Me dicare. See Judith M. Feder, Medicare: The Politics of Federal Hospital Insurance
53-57 (1977).
Fee-for-se rvice me dicine has gradually given way to fixed-fee arrangements for
delive ring health care (although fee-for-serv ice remains an important fixture of th e
medical scene, albeit in more cost-conscious forms).
Private health maintenance
organizations (" HMOs ") typically pay physicians by a capitation method (a set amount for
every patient seen or care d for) or by a fixed salary. HMO compensation methods were
designed to mute th e incentive to provide additional, possibly unwarranted , care that
existed under a fee-for-service regime. HMO compensation methods accomplish this goal
only impe rfectly and at the cost o f c re ating a differe nt set of po tentially perverse
incentives. For e xample, payme nt by way of fixed salary may lead a physician to see fewer
patients or to spe nd less time with them , since the ph ys ician receives the sa m e payment
regardless of how hard he works. Capitation places a pre mium on seeing as many pati e nts
as poss ibl e, decreasing the time spent with each. Further , "[e]ven with th e ir built-in
incentive to limit care, pure salary a nd capita tion may not provide sufficient inc e ntive for
physicians to limit th e costs of care provided to th e ir patients." Orentlicher, supra note
11, at 159. Under both arrangements, physicians may seek to sa tisfy th e ir patients by
"a lter(ing] the mix o f services provided," id. , in a way th at reli es less on th e primary
physician's attention, and mo re o n a ncillary se rvices such as so phi s ticate d tes ts,
co mplicat ed and protracted th erapies, or s pecialty care. See id. at 159-60. The e nd result
could well be an increase rather than a decrease in overa ll costs.
T o counteract these te nd e nci es and minimi ze ph ysic ians ' us e of a ncillary se rvices, health
care plans have reli ed o n other devices such as bonuses, fee withholds, or ex panded
capitation. See id. at 160 (outlining the mechanics o f th ese dev ices). The common feature
in these payment me thods is that the physici a n stands to earn mo re by limiting patients'
use o f ancillary se rvice s, includin g o utside referrals, expensive treatments,
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stant flux, and it is difficult to assess the relative salience of different
strands of professional tradition in setting the standards of care. It is reasonable to expect that even physicians who are most insulated from cost
constraints (like fee-for-servi ce physicians treating fully-insured patients)
are not wholly immune to the influe nce of physicians who operate under
greater cost constraints. The point is that medical practice is not a
monolith . Moreover, the changes and uphea vals now underway in the
organization of health care may foment additional, as yet unknown, shifts
in the grass-roots balance of culture and influence that determine the
standards and methods of medical practice.
It is not possible to address here the difficult question of whether bed18
side rationing in any of its various forms can be defended. Rather, the
point of this Comment is that any credible commentary on the role of
technology assessment must accept that the actual hold of the absolutist
hospita liza tions , a nd diagnostic tests.
8
' Bedside rat io ning is hi ghl y controversia l.
It has bee n co nde mn ed as unworkable,
un e thi ca l, a nd th eore tically indefens ibl e. See Elhauge , Allocating H e a lth Ca re Morally,
supra note 8, a t 1465-72 (reviewing arg ume nt s critical of bedside rationing); Hall, supra
note 10, a t 703-11 (same). Critics of physician-based rationing re ly o n many of the same
arguments that are directed at instituti ona l a nd rule-based schemes, a nd raise additional
objections tha t are specific to ph ys ici a n-directed limitations o n care, including the
pote ntial conflict of interest create d by the physicians' paramount ob ligati o n to vindicate
the interes ts of th e patient and to use be st medical judgmen t, a nd the inability of
individual physicians to take cognizance of sys te mic concerns of fairness a nd comparati ve
need . See , e.g. , H a ll , supra note 10 , a t 703-05 & nn. 31-32 (reviewing opposition to bedside
rati o ning based on concern about the physician 's role in the rationing decision );
Orentlicher , supra note 11 , at 165 (acknowledging that under a physic ia n-base d rationing
regim e, " there would be a great deal of inco nsistency from physician to physician, " and
th at trea tm e nt deci sions might " turn more o n the personal views o f the patient's physician
than o n any overa rching rationing principles").
Attempts by health care provid e r orga nizations, such as HMOs , to create financial
incentives for physicians to limit care have e ncountered particularly ad ama nt opposition.
Se e , e.g., D a vid M . Frankford, Managing Me dical Clinicians ' Work Through the Use of
Financi a l Ince ntives , 29 Wake Fores t L. Rev. 71 (1994) (concluding tha t the use of
fin anc ia l ince ntives is likely to result in increase d conflict rather than grea te r control);
David Mec hanic , Professional Judgmen t and th e R a tioning of Medical Care , 140 U. Pa. L.
R ev. 1713 , 1748 (1992) ("[p]ersonal remu nera ti o n arra ngeme nts tha t improperly modify
me dical d ec isio n-mak ing by providing economi c incentives to doctors to withhold services
should be prohibited"); Ore ntliche r, supra no te 11 , a t 161 -62 (d isc ussing critiques tha t
characterize the use of financial incentives to limit care as a threa t to patient welfare and a
violat io n of the fiduciary nature of th e physician-patient re la tions hi p) ; Daniel P. Sulmasy,
Ph ys ic ia ns, Cost Co ntrol, and Eth ics , 116 Annals Internal Me d. 920, 923 -24 ( 1992)
(cri tique of arg uments in fav or of fin a ncia l incentive contro l); see a lso Steffi e
Woo l ha ndl er & Da vid U. Himm e lstei n, Ex treme Risk-The New Corpora te Proposition
for Physicia ns, 333 New Eng. J. Me d. 1706 (1995) (expressing fe a r of a nticipa te d ill effects
from HMO cost-consciousness). But cf. Hall, supra note 10, at 706 ("A divergent wing of
less absolutist physicians and ethicists are more acco mmodating to bedside rationing.") &
n.37 (co ll ecting so urces of support of this position by e thicists); Orentlicher , supra note 11,
at 156-58 , 192-97 (argu ing in fav o r of phys ici a n-based rati o ning a nd fin anc ia l incentives to
limit medical ca re) .
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paradigm, although formidable, is less than absolute, because bed sid e rati oning remains an important force in med icine today. My thesis is that
technology assessment h as a vital role to play in nouri shing and m aintaining the practice of be dside rationing , and in insuring that the practice
is not abused. Absolutists find all form s of rationing unacceptable , but
eve n those who defend the practice recognize that abuses are p oss ible . ~
I submit that the most important source of arbitrary and ind e fensibl e
limi ts on care is ignorance, and it is technology assess ment 's role to reduce ignorance.
To understand how technology asse ssment could encourage physici anbased rationing of the most benign form, one must accept thre e imp ortant propositions about the real world of medicine. First, when costbenefit tradeoffs are made in actual m ed ical practice, they are often
based not on accurate information but on intuiti on, prejudice , anecdo te,
or unsubstantiated lore . Care-limiting decisions that are inform ed by
medical outcomes data generated throu gh technology assessment- whi ch
I would term " well-informed rationing"- a re comparati vely rare. Second , most instances of rationing will be co nfined to " cutting corne rs" o r
forgo ing treatment "at the margins. " That is, a decision not to d o "e verything possible" (at least not all at once) , will usually be made because the
physician and patient believe that the ben efits of the interventions at issue will be modest or quite uncertain , or that th e possible advantages will
be counterbalanced by th e threat of signifi ca nt complications o r side ef20
fects. Third , as Professor Elhauge him se lf ack nowle dges , much recent
new medical technology and innovati on- both in diagnosis and treatme nt- is of small marginal benefit compa red with existing method s.
Methods that save or dramatically improve the life of all those afflicted
with a particular life-threatening disease are now few and far betwee n ."
Positive effects will be seen in only a few patients within the target group,
and these effects will be of modest m agnitude or transient duration .
Rarely do new therapies present the beneficial equivalent of penicillin ,
insulin or appendectomy. That is not to say that there are no significant
advances whatsoever. 2'· For whatever reason, however, most progress
1

,., Defe nders includ e Professo rs Ha ll and Ore ntli che r. See H a ll , supra note 10;
O re ntlich e r, supra note II .
2" Elhauge, supra note I, at 1546 (arguing that th e hea lth care sys tem has rece ntly made
"a lot more care ava il ab le with a hi gh cost relativ e to it s benefit ").
" Th e reason for this tr end is unclear. It may be th a t medi cal science has tackl ed th e
"easy" problems , so th at o nl y th e complex and difficult ones re main. For a di sc uss ion of
poss ible factors be hind the slow in g of scientific progress, see ge ne rally John Ho rgan, The
End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowl edge in th e Twili ght of the Scientific Age
(1996).
" The drug ta xo l. for examp le. has made a significa nt diffe re nce in prognosis and qua lit v
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now come s in slow increments, and new agents usually offer very small
23
marginal gains . And those benefits are often purchased at extravagant
cost. Most new drugs are expensive, due in large part to the prolonged
and risky process of development, and the elaborate and extensive clinical testing required to satisfy Food and Drug A dministration (FDA)
24
standards of safety and efficacy. The protections afforded by the patent
system and other legislation designed to shelter investment and reward
25
innovation combine with the demands of new drug development to
drive up the cost of even the most marginally useful treatments .
· There are many examples of new medical technologies for which cost
is extremely high , and benefit is slight, marginal or unproven. For example, in treating metastatic breast cancer, the use of bone marrow transplantation is extremely expensive, potentially traumatic and risky. Virtually every well-controlled study has failed to show that the treatment has
2
any statistically significant effect on duration of survival. " Similarly, a
of life for patients with ovarian cancer. See Monroe E. Wall & Mansukh C. Wani ,
Ca mpto thecin a nd Taxol: Discovery to Clinic-Thirteenth Bruce F. Ca in Memorial
Award Lecture , 55 Cancer R es. 753, 757 (1995) (citing " numerous observat ions of partial
and complete rem issio n of advanced ovarian cancer in women").
Despite the
proliferation of new drugs and treatment protoco ls , the pace of progress for many forms of
ca nce r has been disappointing. See D av id Plorkin, Good News a nd Bad News About
Breast Cancer, Atlantic Monthly, June 1996, a t 53; see also John Re nnie & Ricki Rustin g,
Making Headway against Cancer, Scientific Am., Sept. 1996, at 56. See ge ne rally What
You Need to Know About Cancer, Scientific Am. (Special Issue) , Sept. 1996.
' 3 For examples of the small marginal benefits that new agents offer , se e infra notes 2628 and accompanying text.
'J See, e.g., Ke nneth I. Kaitin, Michael Manocchia, Mark Seibring & Lo uis Lasagna , The
New Drug Approvals of 1990, 1991, and 1992: Trends in Drug D eve lopme nt, 34 1. Clinical
Pharmacology 120, 125-27 (1994) (discussing de lays in FDA approval of ne w drugs); see
also Ke nneth I. Kaitin , Nancy Mattison, Frances K. Northington & Louis Lasagna, The
Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug Introductions in th e Un it ed States and in th e United
Kingdom, 1977 through 1987, 46 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 121, 133 tbl. x
(1989) (charting the United States' lag behind th e United Kingdom in introducing
endocrine age nts); Patri cia J. Kenney, The Orpha n Drug Act-Is it a Barrier to
Innovation ? Does it Create Unintended Windfalls?, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 667, 667-68
(1988) (citing the assertion made by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association that
the average new drug takes ten years and costs over 100 milli o n dollars to bring to
market ).
25 See Drug Price Compe tition and Pate nt Term Res to rati o n Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417 , 98 Stat. 1584 (1984) (extending patent life on se lec ted brand-name drugs); 21
U.SC. ~ 360bb(a)(2) (1994) (defining rare diseases as dise ases affecting less than 200,000
persons in the United Stat es, or diseases affecting more than 200,000 people in the U nited
States, but for which the re is no reaso nable expectation that the cos t of making the drug
will be recovered in sales of the drug in the United States); see al so Kenney , supra note
25, at 668 (arguing th a t to e nco urage th e development of drugs fo r rare diseases, eco nomic
incentives are needed).
26
See , e.g., Thomas J. Smith , Bruce E . Hi liner & Christopher E. Desch, Efficacy a nd
Cost-Effectiveness of Ca nce r Treatment: Rational Allocation of Resources Based on
Decision Analysis , 85 J. Nat'! Cance r Inst. 1460, 1468 (1993) ("·the re are no randomized
clinical trial data confirming that thi s therap y is more effective than standard treatment " );
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number of drugs recently approved by the FDA show modest, short-lived
or ambiguous effects. Demonstrating that these drugs have a ny benefit
whatsoever requires trials of many thousands of patients. Scientists must
conduct sophisticated and sometimes problematic statistical analyses in
an often unsuccessful attemgt to identify subgroups of patients who
might be helped by the drug. W ith respect to diagnostic techniques the
situation is not much different. New scanners, screening techniques, and
blood tests significantly add to medical expenditures overall, but fr equently present only a marginal improvement over existing method s,
pro vide a net health benefit that is very difficult to measure , or have a
28
high error rate that confounds their usefulness.
see also Mark A. H a ll & Ge rard F. And erson , H e alth Insure rs' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637, 1637-38 n.3 (1992) (c iting studi es).
27
Rece nt e xamples demonstrating this phenomenon include Betaseron fo r multipl e
sclerosis , see Anne Allen, The High-Stakes Drug Drawing, 9 J. Post An esth esia Nursing
52, 53 (1994) (desc ribing the time-intensive process required for FDA approval o f
Betaseron for multiple sc leros is); Int er leukin-2 for renal cell ca nce r, see B. Escudier,
Immunother apie dans le cancer du re in metasta tique [Immuno therapy fo r Metastatic
Re na l Ce ll Cance r], 24 La Presse Med ical e 1504, 1504 (1995) (e mphas izi ng the need to
continue rigorous clinical tri a ls of interleukin-2 as a treatment for met ast a tic renal cell
ca nce r); granulocyte- mac ro phage colony-stimulating factors ("GM-CSF ") for low blood
counts associa ted with AIDS a nd cancer, see Regis T Costello, Therapeutic Use of
Granulocyte-Macrophage Colony-Stimulating Factor ( G M- CSF): A re vi ew of re ce nt
experience, 32 Acta Oncologica 403, 406 (1993) (concluding that the full benefits of G MCSF in cancer th e rap y have still to be prove n, a nd that the drugs' "effe cti ve be nefit has to
be very ca refu ll y evaluated befor e extensive use of such sophisticated an d e xpe nsi ve
th e rapy "); T ac rin e fo r a lzhei me r's disease, see M. L ynn Crismon, Tacrine: First Drug
Approved for Alzheimer's Disease, 28 A nna ls Pharmacotherapy 744 (1994) (arguing th a t
despite FDA approval of T ac rin e for treatm e nt of Alzheimer's disease, clinica lly
me aningful effec ts ha ve no t been de monstra ted) ; Gina Ko lata, Hopes Are R osy o n
Alzheimer's , But Res ults Slim , N.Y. Times , Jul y 30, 1996, at Cl , C3 (describing the "one
drug o n the market [Tacrine ]" for Alzheimer's disease as " ma rginall y effective a t bes t" );
Prosca r for benign prosta tic hype rtroph y, see Lawrence K. Altm a n, U. S. Study Compares
Merits of Lea ding Prostate Drugs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22 , 1996, at A18 (re porting on a
clinic a l stud y sho wing that Prosc ar, which tre a ts the sy mptoms of benign prostatic
hypertrophy, " is no better than a dumm y pill o r placebo"); and tP A for post-heart a ttac k
coronary artery atherosclerotic blockage, see R o bert McNutt & Arthur Evans,
Accelerated tPA versus Streptokinase for Suspected Myocard ia l Infarct ion: Waiting for
o ur Mo untain D ew, 15 Med. D ecisi o n Making 395 ( 1995) (cl ai ming th a t ex te nsive clini ca l
tri a ls that compare responses to tPA and to th e less expe nsi ve drug streptokinase a re of
minimal benefit when making decisions a bout individua l pa ti e nts with charac te risti cs
different from th e trial group).
28 See, e.g. , Alvin I. Mushlin & Lo u Fintor, Is Scre e nin g fo r Breast Cance r CostEffective ? , 69 Cance r 1957 ( 1992) (em ph as izing th e nee d fo r cost-benefit analyses of
breast cancer screening programs); David M. Edd y, Vi cto r Hasselblad , Willi a m McGivney
& William Hendee, The Value of Mam mo graphy Sc re eni ng in W o men U nd er Age 50
Years, 259 J AMA 1512 (1988) (de ta ilin g the costs a nd benefits of ma mmography for
wo me n under 50); see a lso Margaret T e mpe ro , R a nd a ll Brand , Kar e n Holdeman &
Aurelio Matamoros, New Im aging T ec hniques in Co lorectal Ca nce r, 22 Seminars in
Oncology 448 (1995) (reviewi ng th e use of radio immun od iag nos is , e ndoscopic and
intraopera ti ve ultrasound, magnetic resonance ima gi ng (MRI), and positron emissi on
to mography ( PET) in the diagnosis of intra-abdominal malignancies and no ting the
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Careful, accurate, and sophisticated outcomes assessment is the best,
and indeed , the only reliable way to identify and measure the magnitud e
of the costs and benefits of many new therapies. Even und er the most
rigorous and well-controlled circumstances , it is technically ve ry difficult
to quantify with any confidence the effects of innovations that represent
only marginal improvements over existing techniques or interve ntions.
Necessarily, measurements are subject to various kinds of e rror and re quire assumptions that render the m little more than best estimates.
These observations apply not just to innovative therapies , but also to established treatments, some of which will also be of questionable or marginal value in some or all patients who have received treatment.
But, even with all of its impe rfections and difficulties, technology assessment's irreplaceable role in d ocumenting the cost-benefit ratio makes
the technique vitally important to the optimal operation of bedside rationing. Technology assess ment allows conscientious physicians to think
through the possible approaches to diagnosis and treatment in a systematic and informed manner, rather than relying on intuition , anecdote and
limited personal experience. Armed with information about medical
benefit, efficacy, side effects and overall expense, physicians who have a
scientifically sound understanding of the likely costs and effects of treatment choices can formulate more reasoned treatment plans for individual
patients in the least harmful and most cost-effective way.
I submit, however, that the key to technology assessment's pivotal role
in fostering informed limits on care lies not with the physician , but with
the patient. Although sound information is obviously important in permitting physicians to make more informed judgments, it is even more important in enabling a physician to present the basis for his or her judgment in a way that is likely to gain the assent and cooperation of patients.
To the extent that the information provided by technology assessment
has the power to foster a reduction in the consumption of medical resources, it will do so mainly by creating the conditions under which patients are more likely to go along with reasonable restraints on the provi sion of care . All too often, the non-specific demand that health care
providers "do everything possible " is a manifestation of ignorance and
fear rather than reasoned decision-making based on knowledge and concrete information. Without precise data about costs and benefits, patients will be frightened by the inestimable possibility that a chosen path
will sacrifice significant palliation or cure. Patients are more likely to accept tradeoffs and risks wh en their physician 's recommendations are
backed by the rigorous, trustworthy, and precise scientific estimates of
costs and benefits that outcomes assessment data can provide. And not
continuing nee d for cost-benefit analys is).
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only does technology assessment enable physicians to provide patients
with convincing and precise evidence of the marginality of the benefits
offered by many cutting-edge treatments , but it also allows physicians to
pinpoint areas of uncertainty and to advise patients about what is known
and unk nown concerning the effects of new and existing options. If patients can be made to appreciate the (some times flimsy) scientific basis
for some interventions, they may go along more readily with recommendations that certain particularly expensive therapies or procedures be
forgone or put off.
Some examples show how information technology can foster patientphysician joint decision-making that resolves towards less rather than
more interventionist care . Mark Hall illustrates the kind of bottom-up
rationing that frequently occurs in practice by offering a hypothetical
based loosely on a p~1sician ' s handling of a knee injury his wife received
while playing tennis : H e states that his wife's physician estimated that
there was a ninety percent chance that the injury was a ligament strain
(ordinarily treated by resting the affected limb) , and a ten percent chance
that the injury was a more severe ligament tear, which in turn had a ten
percent chance of leading to permanent impairment if left untreated .
T he most definitive resolution of the diagnostic uncertainty would have
been to perform a magnetic resonance imaging scan (costing twelve hundred dollars) immediately. The physician, after consulting with the patient, decided against ordering the scan. A quick recovery proved the
gamble harmless.
As Hall points out, this situation does not present the kind of dramatic
life-or-death dilemma that dominates the rationing literature. The reality
is far less riveting. Through his hypothetical, Hall attempts to provide a
more realistic picture of the small, incremental and routine decisions that
physicians make every day-decisions like "declining to order a confirming diagnostic test or an extra day in the hospital, prescribing a less
3
expensive drug, or avoiding a referral to a specialist. " ° For each of these
decisions, the stakes are comparatively small for individual patients, but
the costs of indulging extreme risk aversion at every point add up in the
aggregate to significantly greater expense for the system.
Hall's example also illustrates that it is a mistake to think of every
medical judgment that can be characterized as not doing everything possible as a sharp departure from norms of acceptable medical practice.
First, in most routine cases of medical diagnosis and tre atment, it is not
readily apparent precisely what doing everything possible would mean .

~·> H a ll ,

supra note 10, at 711-12.

·''' Id. at 712.
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T h ere are often a number of ways to approach a particular medical
problem, especially since details of presentation always differ from patient to patient. Flexible conventions, seiectively applied through the exercise of individual judgment, are the essence of ordinary medical practice, and can give rise to many alternative strategies for dealing with dayto-day medical scenarios. A measui·ed and grad ually escalating sequence
of tests and interventi ons often represents the most acceptable course of
ac tion. In creating that sequence- contrary to P rofessor Elhauge's assumption-the prevailing standard of care is capacious enough to include
31
cases in which "high costs are not justified by minor expected benefits. "
A lthough Hall's story is not primaril y about the use of cutting edge
technologies, it presents a good exampl e of the kind of decisi on-m aking
at the margin-decision-making that invites "the prudent trimming of in32
creme ntally beneficial se rvices" - that physicians must engage in when
determining whether and how to use innovative drugs or treatments . But
in order to m ake decisions a t the margins it is necessary to know where
th e margins are. Hall d oes not comment on the source or re liability of
the probability estimates used in his anecdote . It is easy to devise numbers for use in a hypothetical , but only technology assessment can generate accurate data in a form that can be applied to real-life decisionmaking.
An arena in which sophisticated technology assessment has the potential to play an important role in the evolution of standards of medical
practice is in the care of terminally ill and severely afflicted patients, especially among the elderly. Innovations in intensive care have represented genuine medical progress, but have also fomented grass-roots disillusionment with prolonged, expensive and agonizing end-of-life interventions. 33 This disillusionment has produced a more open public debate
on the ethics of setting limits on care, which in turn has fueled shifts in
34
concepts of death with dignity, a renewed emphasis on home and hos-

'' !d. a t 713.
2
·' !d . at 712.
'·' See, e.g. , Geoffrey Cow le y & Ma ry H ager, Terminal Care: T oo Painful, Too
Pro longed , Newsweek, D ec. 4 , 1995, a t 74 , 75 ; see a lso Jam es Studnicki, David V.
Sch a pira, Jon V. Straumfj o rd, Robert A. C lark , J a n Marshburn & Dennis C. Werner , A
Nat ional Profile of the Use of Inte nsive Care by Medicare Patients with Ca nce r, 74
Ca ncer 2366, 2368 (1994) (reporting findin gs that of 792 ,584 Medicare beneficiaries
admitted with cancer in FY 1990, total Medicare charges were ove r $9.3 billion , of which
$452.229,180 (4.9% of total) we re ICU charges).
'"See, e.g., Paul Wilkes, The Next Pro-Lifers, NY. Times, July 21, 1996, § 6 (Magaz ine) ,
a t 22 , 24 (c iting an Apri11996 Gallup poll showing that 75% o f Americans be lieve doctors
sho uld be allowe d to end th e Jives of termin a ll y ill pati e nts by painless means a t the
patient 's request); see also Don Co lburn. US. Pati e nts' Dying Wishes Often Ig nore d:
Stud y Finds Hospita l Care Depersonalized, Resis tant to Cha nge , Wash. Post, Nov. 22,
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pice car~ fo~ the dyin?, a nd a change ~n med ical co~ventions reg ar?in ~
the apphcatwn and w1thdrawal of care fo r those neanng the end of hfe. ·
These changed attitudes can be expected to find expression in greater
public and institutional acceptance of physician restraint a nd se lfregulation at the bedside.
Once again, the practical fea sibility of physicia ns and families deciding
to for go heroic trea tme nts depe nds critically on the availability of relia ble
informatio n. Patients and doctors need sophisticated and trustworthy
data abo ut the patient's prospects for survival and recovery and about
the efficacy, side effects and costs of the m yriad interve ntions that are
availabl e to the gravely ill. Dr. W illiam K naus, at the Un iversity of Virginia Medical Center, has launched a groundbreaking tech no logy assessment project designed to look at just such parameters. D r. K naus's computer program and database, called APACHE, creates profiles of
thousand s of patients ad mitted to hospital intensive care units ("ICUs"),
carefully records the types of treatments received, and tracks outcomes
provided fo r patients with a spectrum of conditions and characteristics.
T he program then identifies the specific attributes of patients who benefit
from pl ace ment in an ICU and from th e interventions availabl e in that
37
setting. Armed with this kind of information , families, physici ans, and
patients can make more informed decisions about whether and when to
opt for intensive care and when to forgo or terminate that opti o n. Because individuals always differ somewhat from the populations profiled
35

1995, a t Al.
35
See F rankli n G. Miller & Joseph J . Fins, A Pro posa l to Restructure H ospi ta l Ca re fo r
Dying Patients, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1740, 1741 (1996) (advocating restructuring care of
hospitali zed dyin g pa tients by creating a hospice -like unit near the ICU th a t wo uld
e mphasize palliation , helping pa tients a nd famili es make decisions about appropriate e nd
of life care); Sidn ey H. Wanze r e ta!. , The Physici a n's R espons ibility to wa rd H ope lessly Ill
Patients : A Second Look , 320 New Eng. J. Me d. 845-46 ( 1989) (advocating ho me a nd
hospice ca re as alternatives to intensive hospitalization giving the dyin g pati e nt th e oppo rtunit y fo r pr ivacy, dignity a nd family close ness ).
36
See, e.g., Dani e l Callah a n , Me dica l Futility, Medical Necessi ty: The Proble m- WithoutA-Name, Hastings Ctr. Rpt ., July-Aug. 1991, at 30,34 (asserting "t hat so m e will want to
ex tend th e not io n of [medica l] futility well beyo nd the persistent vege ta tive sta te to cases
of severe dementia and multi -o rgan fa ilure "); Wanzer e t a!. , supra note 35 , a t 847-49
(advocating use of pain relievers eve n if they sho rt e n life spa n and exa mining th e prac tice
of assist ed suicide a nd euthanasia as occas ionally ne cess a ry final steps in a co ntinuum of
care for hopelessly ill patients).
37
See Richard B. Becke r eta!. , Th e Use of A PACH E III to E va lu a te ICU Le ngth of
Stay, Resource Use , a nd Mor ta lity afte r Co ro nary Artery By-Pass Sur ge ry, 36 J . Cardiovascular Surge ry 1 (1995); William A. Knaus e t a!. , The A PACH E III Prognosti c System:
Risk Predic tion of H os pital Mo rtality for Critically Ill Hospitalized Adults, 100 C hest 161 9
(1991); W illiam A. Knaus eta!. , An Evaluation of Outcome from Inte nsive Care in Major
Medical Ce nte rs, 104 A nn a ls Inte rn a l Med. 410 (1986); David T. Wo ng & W illiam A.
Knaus, Pred icting O utcom e in Critical Care : Th e Current Sta tus of th e A PACHE
Prognostic Scorin g Sys tem , 38 C an. J. Anesthesia 374 (1991 ).
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in a database, programs like APACHE can never entirely eliminate the
risk and un certainty surrounding care decisions, but they can help to
greatly reduce the guesswork inhere nt in these difficult choices . Once
agai n, patie nts and families ma y be more willing to make hard choices
when they believe the y are operating from sound knowledge rather than
e ngaging in wholly uninformed speculation. F amilies prefer to face risks
that are fa irly well known rather than of uncertain magni tude. A physician's ability to lay out the risks in a scientifically credible and precise
mann er tends to engender greater trust and confid ence in the physician's
judgment. T he value of the type of information generated by a program
like A PACHE is not confined to cases in which heroic measures can be
38
said to be entirely futile . Even in cases where patients may receive some
minimal benefit-as where interventions may prolong life for days or
e ven wee ks- a more reliable projection m ay enable families and doctors
to feel more comfortable forgoing intrusi ve or expensive treatme nts or
concluding that continuing care carries intole rable costs in lost dignity
and prolongation of suffering.
The role proposed here for information technol ogy as an aid to wise
limits on care is potentially ope n to a number of objections. First, as Professor Elhauge points out , information is a public good, and will te nd to
39
be in short supply in the private market unless access is restricted. If

3 ~ Medical et hicis ts have e nga ge d in a longstanding d ebat e about th e scope of th e
concept of " futil e " me di ca l ca re , and whether accep ted medical prac ti ce should exclu de
th e require me nt of offering futile care. Much of th e debate stems from confus io n over th e
definition o f futility. Th e term is sometimes used to re fer to care th a t is usually of no
benefit , but may so metimes help in a few cases. Alternatively, it can be appli ed more
narrowly to ca re that is be lieve d to be o f no benefit to a nyo ne . See , e .g., Jere m y
Sugarman, Talking About Futility, Hastings Ct r. Rpt., May-June 1996, at 41 (reviewing
Lawrence J . Schneiderman & Nancy S. J ecke r, Wrong Medicine (1995)) (discussing
various ways in which th e term futility is vi e wed ); see a lso Ca lla han, su pra no te 37 , at 31
(discussing th e di fficult y o f defining me dica l futility an d th e distinction m ade between
quan tita ti ve futilit y-defined as '"an expecta ti o n of success th a t is e ither pred icta bl y or
e mpiri ca ll y so unlikely th a t its exact pro bability is often incalculable"'-and qualitative
futility- '"a ny treatme nt that me re ly preserves permanent unconsciousness or that fa il s to
e nd to ta l dependence on inte nsi ve med ical care'") (quoting Lawrence J . Schneiderman,
Nancy S. J ec ker & Albert R. J anse n, Medical Futility: Its Mea ning and Ethical
Implica ti o ns, 112 Annals Inte rnal Med. 949 , 950,952 (1 990)); Ma ry A. Crossley, Medical
Futility and Disability Di scrimination , 81 Iowa L. R ev. 179, 182-202 (1995) (disc uss in g th e
parameters of the d e bate over medical futility); Nancy S. Jecker, Medical Futility a nd
Care of Dying Pa ti en ts , 163 W. J . Med. 287 (1995) (descr ibing a " pat ien t- cen tered "
definiti o n o f medi cal futility in which th e meas ure is whether a give n tr ea tm e nt bene fits
the patient in a way he o r she can ap preciate , as opposed to merely producing effects on
orga n syste ms or body parts). In a ny eve nt , th e futility debate is littl e more th an an
abstract exercise unless it is possible to document with so me degree of accuracy th e e ffects
o f in te rven ti o ns commo nl y applied in end -of- life situ a ti ons. That is th e job of te chno logy
assessment.
·" See Elhauge, supr a note 1, at 1574-75.
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outcomes data are to be widely available, the government must get into
the business of funding technology assessment projects, which could
prove quite expensive if maintained at the level necessary to produce significant effects. Second, this Comment assumes that non-academic practitioners will make regular use of outcomes data in discussing treatment
plans with their patients . It may be objected that this represents an unrealistic expectation, because it sets an unreachable standard for busy physicians. Most practicing doctors lack the time and the sophistication to
become familiar with the complex details of the outcomes assessment literature. Understanding the significance of the technology assessment data and applying it to particular cases requires careful study and a prolonged investment of effort. For their part, patients cannot function effect ively as joint decision-makers unless they have at least a rudimentary
appreciation for the scientific method and its application in the clinical
setting, and are prepared to accept and assess uncertainty. Most importantly, the paradigm cannot work well unless both doctor and patient are
comfortable with the idea that there is more than one reasonable approach to clinical problems, and are prepared to abjure the notion that
proper medical care entails a single strategy of doing everything possible
at any cost.
There is some basis for believing that the medical profession is currently ill-equipped to make meaningful use of the kinds of information
generated by technology assessment. Keeping up with, evaluating and
applying the outcomes literature requires providers to devote more time
to individual patients than is now generally available. The problem is
likely to worsen as medical practice grows increasingly cost conscious and
40
productivity pressures on physicians increase. Assessing the significance
of studies of new technologies also requires an understanding of statistics,
epidemiology, and clinical trials design that may not be widespread
among practitioners. Nevertheless, the explosion of knowledge and the
greater sophistication of routine medical practice have made familiarity
with the technology assessment literature, and the willingness and ability
to share some of that knowledge with patients, vital components of good
patient care. In educating physicians to meet this standard, too little attention has been paid to the development of skills for assessing complex
clinical research studies. The medical profession should place greater
0
' See generally Charles M. Barker III, Maximizing Efficiency in the Management of th e
P hysician Practice: Survival unde r Managed Care, J. Health Care Fin., Summer 1996, at 22
(discussing the increased pressure to maximize revenue and control expenses placed on
physicians by the growth of managed care); Robert Kuttner, Columbia/HCA and th e
R esurge nce of the For-Profit Hospital Business (First of Two Parts), 335 New Eng. J.
Med. 362 (1996) (discussing th e medical, ethical and public policy issues raised by the
resurge nce of for-profit hospitals).
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emphasis on physician training in epidemiology, statistics, study design,
41
and technology assessment. Also, the medical care system should introduce reforms designed to encourage physicians to spend more time talk42
ing with patients and thinking about patients ' individual needs. Although technology assessment cannot correct the misplaced priorities
that create distorted incentives in these areas, these problems must be
addressed if the information generated through technology assessment is
to form a useful basis for hard choices.
General skepticism about both the desirability and existence of bedside rationing also obstructs the promotion of technology assessment for
its potential to encourage restraint in the consumption of medical care.
As already noted, both top-down and physician-based rationing have
been roundly criticized as a formula for ineq uity, injustice, and compro43
mise of patient interests. Payment structures believed to encourage physician-driven reductions in the level of care , including those that offer
physicians direct financial incentives to minimize care, have come under
44
fire as creating ethical conflicts of interest. Also, the physician-based
model proposed here does nothing to alleviate the trans-systemic arbitrariness that is the central weakness of "grass-roots" rationing. 45 There
is no doubt that serious inequities can result from decentralized and individualized methods for allocating medical resources in a system where
access to insurance, state-of-the-art facilities , and sophisticated, wellinformed care providers varies dramatically. Although the generation of
" See generally William L. Roper, William Winkenwerder, Glenn M. Hackbarth &
Henry Krakauer, Effectiveness In Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve
Medical Practice , 319 New Eng. J. Me d. 1197 (1988) (discussing the "e ffectiveness
initiative " and the necessity for physicians to ha ve th ese skills in order to cope with the
complexiti es of modern practice).
' 2 For sources noting this problem, see, e.g.,
Sherrie H. Kaplan & Lisa M. Sullivan ,
Maximizing the Quality of the Physician-Patient Encounter, 11 .1. Gen. Internal Med. 187,
187-88 (1996) (arguing that the decreased duration and frequency of patient office visits
for cost-containment purposes should be countered, in part , with increased training of
physicians to maximize interpersonal contact with pati e nts); A. James Lee & Janet B.
Mitchell, Physician Reaction to Price Changes: An Episo de-of-Care Analysis, Health Care
Financing Rev., Winter 1994, at 65 (desc ribin g the 1989 Medicare fee schedule reform as
redressing the previous system's "ove rpay[ment]" ' of tec hnical proced ures and
"underpay[ment]" of office visits).
' ·' See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text .
.w See Orentlicher, supra note 11, at 162-63 (reviewing legislation and proposals to
restrict th e use of payments to physicians, which are designed to induce them to reduce or
limit medically necessary services); see also Woo lhandl e r & Himme lste in, supra note 18 ,
at 1706 (questioning the effectiveness of financial ince ntives in inducing physicians to limit
care) ; cf. Robert Pear, U.S. Shelves Plan to Limit R e ward s to H.M.O. Doctors, N.Y.
Times , July 8, 1996, at AI (reporting on the Departm e nt of Hea lth a nd Huma n Service 's
decision to suspend th e e nforcement of rules restricting HMOs' ability to use financial
incentives to reward doctors for controlling the use and cost of medical care).
'' See Hall , supra note 10, at 714-19; Orentlicher, supra not e 11 , at 165.
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mto rm ation through technology assessment presents the potential for
eventual consensus on the proper use of new technologies by offering a
common factual foundation for decision-making, it does little in itself to
enforce comprehensive consistency in the use of medical resources, and
m ay introduce new inequities through the misallocation of a key resource-information about the effects of treatment options-in favo r of
the well-informed and well-heeled. Although this Comment does not
deal with the merits of these issues, it recognizes that accepting th e role
for technology assessment outlined here de pends on endorsing a normative view of rationing as a not entirely undesirable feature of the medical
care syste m, and on believing that the dangers posed by a system that
routinely tolerates the sacrifice of potentially beneficial care can be
minimized and controlled.
Accepting the thesis of this C omment also depends on accepting the
prediction that, all else being equal, the provision of outcomes information will influence actual decision-making. W ill making the physicianpatient interaction better informed actually lead to a reduction in the
consumption of medical care? T hat question must ultimately be answered empirically. At this symposium, Professor Trebilcock suggested
that a reduction in care will never materialize because rationing is a
straightforward function of the econ omic pressures placed on the individual doctor and patient; in the absence of direct financial incentives to
conserve resources , collective action problems and self-interest will effec46
tively prevent rationing from occurring. That view is almost certainly
too simplistic, because it discounts the possibility that conventions and
norms influence medical practice, and that norms not only can persist
without economic incentives in their favor but can even survive in the
face of mild economic penalties. It also fails to take account of forces
currently at work in some parts of the health care system that would tend
to maintain pre-existing norms of medical practice that were shaped by
47
the need to deal with scarcity. Those forces can have influence even
outside the strongholds of cost-conscious medical practice (such as managed care plans and HMOs) that reinforce them , and will tend to act as a
counterweight to the absolutist norms and need-driven reimbursement
systems (such as fee-for-service) that oppose any limits on care. The
prevalence and existing modes of bedside rationing are thus unlikely to
be a straightforward function of the direct economic incentives on individual actors. Rather, they will be a complex product of a host of factors,
which include (but are not limited to) the range and intensity of present
'" Re mark s of Michael Tre bilcock at Olin/Virginia Law Re view Symposium , Mar. 1,
1996.

,; See supra notes 14-17 and acc ompan ying te xt.
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cost pressures on physicians and patients system-\vide .
So far, this Comment has focused on the role of technology assessment
in enabling physicians to present options to patients more intelligently
and effectively. Technology assessment can also work to undermine the
absolutist paradigm by provid ing the b asis for cost-shifting struct ures that
exert direct pressure on patients to reduce the consumption of medical
care. F amiliar device s, such as copayments and deductible s, al ready provid e patients with some modest financi al incentives to forgo or delay care
in general, but do little to differentiate among different types of care.
Technology assessment offers the possibility of applying cost-shifti ng devices in more ta rgeted ways. Better information would enable insurers to
construct a graduated cost-shifting scheme in which reimbursement is
tied to the value of available interventions. Such a cai ibrated system
could attempt to discourage patients from consuming care with a higher
cost-benefit ratio by shifting a greater portion of the costs of marginally
effecti ve or extraordinarily expensive new treatments to consumers.
It would be impossible in practice to create a comprehensive schedul e
of financial incenti ves that precisely reflects the marginal costs and benefits of the full range of care. Even if the method ological p roblems as48
sessing the costs and benefits of interventions could be solved, there are
49
simply too many permutations to make that project fe asible . A more
limited and achievable goal would be to attempt to discourage the overuse of marginally effective services by establishing a purely forwardlooking system of graduated copayments or surcharges cove ring only new
technologies or recently approved therapies, which tied the magnitude of
coverage of costs fo r new services to their expected effects. As previously noted, a significant number of new drugs and treatments are costly
50
but of low or questiona ble utility. As new technologies come along, an
insurer or provider could e valuate the costs and review what is known
about the expected magnitude and probability of benefits. T he new
tre atme nt could be compared to previously available or less expensive
alternatives. Based on these parameters, the insurer could then agree to
cover some portion of the costs, with the rest being charged directly to
the patient. The greater the benefit expected fr om the new intervention ,
the more complete the coverage, and the less the patient must pay di-

''See supra notes 13-17 and accom panying text.
9
" See O rent lich er, supra no te II, at 189 (" T o rely exc lusive ly, or even primarily, on
pati e nt- based incentives (to ration care ] would require a degree of contract spec ificit y that
is not achievable in he alth care. For patients to agre e to less care in re turn fo r lower costs,
th ey would have to be told exactl y wha t kinds of care and how muc h ca re they would
rece ive at eac h premium leve l "').
;n See supra not es 20-25 and acco mpany ing text .
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rectly. The result would be a schedule of cost-sharing that is tied closely
to contemporaneous knowledge for experimental treatments like bone
marrow transplantation, or new drugs like tP A for heart attacks or
51
Tacrine for Alzheimer's disease. Creating a system like the one proposed wo uld depend critically on detailed information gathered through
technology assessment.
To be sure, this proposal shares drawbacks with any approach that offers patients direct financial incentives to avoid care. It is difficult to
work out the terms by which cost-sharing can be combined with providing care to the poor. Any shift of costs directiy to patients makes the distribution of care more sensitive to ability to pay. Many new technologies
will effectively be placed off-limits for the indigent or uninsured unless
the government pays the full freight, which raises troublesome issues of
horizontal equity by forcing decisions about what kinds of expensive care
will be allocated directly to the poor. There are also enormous practical
difficulties in formulating and implementing a service-by-service schedule
of shared payments, even on a limited or prospective basis. Creating a
graduated system would re9,uire establishing a workable and acceptable
measure of medical benefit.'- Even if such a measure could be devised in
principle, decisions in actual cases would require applying generalized
findings gleaned from group studies to unique individuals-a process that
doctors and patients might find intrusive or inept , especially when money
is so directly at stake.
On the other hand, efforts to tie a patient's share of payments for a
new technology to projected benefits might prove more palatable to absolutist watchdogs than other proposals for limiting care. For one thing,
a shared payment paradigm might help bring about an important change
51

For a discussion of these experimental treatments, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52
Profesor Eihauge has addressed the difficulties of trying to assign fungible "value" to
medical benefit from many different kinds of treatments. See Elhauge, supra note 1 at
1589-92; Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 8, at 1493-1526; see also
Jan Paul Acton, Measuring the Monetary Value of Lifesaving Programs, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Autumn 1976, at 46, 46-49 (arguing the need for an objective and readily
applicable measure of benefit from medical procedures to facilitate a cost-benefit
comparison between health and safety programs and other government programs); Maria
A. Friedman, Issues in Measuring and Improving Health Care Quality, Health Care
Financing Rev., Summer 1995, at 1, 4-9 (describing the difficulty in measuring quality and
the need for a workable, uniform definition); Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard,
Where Now For Saving Lives?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1976, at 5, 11-15
(employing use of "Quality Adjusted life Years" to determine efficient health resource
allocation); Caitlin J. Halligan, Note, "Just What The Doctor Ordered": Oregon's
Medicaid Rationing Process and Public Participation In Risk Regulation, 83 Geo. L.J.
2697. 2712-13 (1995) (describing negative reaction to Oregon's use of a public survey to
rank medical procedures for the purpose of creating a priority list of reimbursable
treatment as part of Oregon's Medicaid Rationing Process).
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in thinking about the allocation of medical care. C urrent coverage arrange ments foster an all-or-nothing approach to the use of medical technologies. Although an insurer's denial of payment or coverage is not the
same as a rule barring a patie nt from obtaining care (since a patient can
always choose to pay out-of-pocket for what is not covered), the two
situations have converged in the minds of many participants in the health
53
care system, adding fuel to the fire of absolutism. T hat convergence is
not surprising, in light of insurers' habit of sharply classifying all medical
interventio n into two categories: The medically necessary (wh ich sweeps
in treatme nts thought to offer any benefit whatsoever, however slight)
and the unnecessary or futile (which is equated with no be nefi t ). 5 ~ Once
55
standard deductibles or copayments have been satisfied, care deemed
"necessary" is customaril y paid for at a fixed rate. That rate is insensitive
to how effective a treatment is, or whether there are less expensive or virtually equivalent alternatives. Treatments deemed " unnece ssary" are excluded from coverage altogether. It is this bipolar approach that fosters
the equation of coverage to care, and arouses resi stance to an insurer's
refusal to pay eve n for the most expensive and margi nall y useful interve ntions on the ground that " medically necessary" care has bee n
"de nied. " Departing from a strictly categorical sche me that classifies all
tre atments as either "necessary" or "unnecessary" might help to lessen
the resistance of consumers who are asked to pay more. Different medi-

5' See Elhauge, A llocating H eal th Ca re Mora lly , supra not e 8, at 1493-1526 (sugge sting
th a t re fusal to pay is tantamount to an absolute prohibition on care) .
5
"See, eg, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l)(A) (1994) (services no t pa rt of "reasonable and
necessa ry" care exc luded fr om Medicare coverage) . In 1989, th e Hea lth Care Financing
Adm inistra ti o n (" H CFA") defined a " necessa ry" service as one that " is safe, e ffective ,
no n-investiga ti o na l, a nd app ropriate," and defined "appropri a te·· as mea ning that the
service " is furnished in a setting co mmens ura te with the pa ti ent's medical needs a nd
cond ition, and furnished by qualified personne l. " Criteria and Procedures for Making
Medi ca l Services Coverage Decisions That R ela te to Health Ca re Techn o logies, 54 Fe d.
Reg. 4302, 4307, 4308 (1989) (proposed rul e) (ci ted in Maxwell J . Me hlm an , J effre y R .
Botkin. Alan Scarrow, Amy Woodhall , Juli e Kass & Ellen Siebe nsc huh , Cove ra ge of
Gene tic T ec hnologies und e r Na ti ona l H ea lth R e form, 55 Am. J . Hum . Genet ics 1054,
l 055 , 1060 ( 1994) ); see also Ca ll a han, supra note 36, at 33 (cr iti ciz ing previous a tt e mpts to
define medicall y necessary care as opening the door to an unlimited ra nge o f benefits
rega rdless of cos ts and failin g to take into considerati on th e efficacy of availabl e
treatment); Not e, supra note 52 , at 2706- 16 (descr ibing the Orego n Medicaid Rationing
Process Commission's insiste nce on a fi xe d minimal standard of esse ntial services).
" For exa mpl e, Medicare be neficiar ies are charged a fix e d monthl y pre mium for
insu ra nce under Med icare Pa rt 8 (w hich covers o utpati en t charges and serv ices). Th e
program also pays for a fixed perce ntage (80%) of charges inc urred und e r this Part.
Under Part A, which covers in-hosp ital services, th e re is a ded uctibl e of about $600 , which
th e pa ti en t pays out of pocket. The program pays a fixed amount pe r day for cha rges ove r
and above th at amo unt. See U .S. Dep't of H ea lth & Hum an Se rvices, The Co mpl e te
Med icare Handbook 18-1 9, 34- 35 ( Euge ne La nd ay e d., 1990) (rev iewin g Med ica re
deduct ibles and reimbursement sc he dules).
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cal strategies present a range of benefits and dra wbacks, and are attended by a spectrum of uncertain effects. It is truer to medical realityand may well prove more acceptable to absolutists-to adopt an approach that attempts to reflect the ongoing, dynamic state of knowledge
about the value of care.
A lthough the development of a truly complete understanding of the
costs and benefits of medical care options is an ideal that ma y well be out
of re ac h for both practical and theore tical reasons, our current level of
knowle dge falls far short of the limits that may eventually be encountered. Technology assessment and outcomes research are in their infa ncy , and their potential value in clarifying the most basic parameters of
cost and benefit for new and existing interventions has only begun to be
explored. We have a long way to go before diminishing returns set in ,
and are still at a stage in which serious efforts to chip away at large areas
of ignorance could aid in the making of resource-saving choices. By
showing that some risks are not as great as feared, nor some benefits as
great as hoped for, technology assessment can help patients, families, a nd
providers face up to hard decisions in planning care. T hese results cannot be realize d unless the medical community commits itself to technology assess ment that generates a broad range of reliable and useful information.

